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1Abstract
We consider the problem of how to set a compensation for a portfolio manager
who is required to restrict the investment set, as it happens when applying socially
responsible screening. This is a problem of Delegated Portfolio Management where
the reduction of the investment opportunities to the subset of sustainable assets
involves a loss in the expected earnings for the portfolio manager, compensated by
the investor through an extra bonus on the realized return. Under simple assump-
tions on the investor, the manager and the market, we compute the optimal bonus
as a function of the manager's risk aversion and his expertise, and of the impact
of the portfolio restriction on the Mean Variance ecient frontier. We conclude by
discussing the problem of selecting the best managers when his ability is not directly
observable by the investor.
Keywords: Delegated Portfolio Management; Socially responsible investment; Incentives;
Extrinsic incentives and intrinsic motivations.
21 Introduction
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), that is the selection of assets of rms satisfying
some socially responsible criteria, is receiving a growing attention from private and insti-
tutional investors. Although mainstream Economic theory consider Social Responsibility
as a non-nancial issue that most likely yields extra costs on the rm, there are many
studies that question such an approach and recognize a positive value, also in terms of
nancial performances, to SRI. Mill (2006), like many other studies, try to shed some
light on this point, examining the nancial performance of a socially responsible invest-
ment over time. Platinga and Scholtens (2001), Stone et al. (2001) and Bauer et al.(2007)
compare the performances of SRI funds to those of conventional funds. Kempf and Ostho
(2007), separate the performances of the portfolios from the skill of fund managers, com-
pared specially constructed SRI and non-SRI portfolios. The general picture is still not
clear and the evidence is mixed, because of dierent data sets and dierent interpretation,
however a consistent group of researcher and of investors, believes in the possibility of
"Doing well while doing good". On the other hand, it emerges for instance by the report
by RImetrics (2008), that portfolio managers appear to be reluctant to include SRI into
their investment strategies, mostly for the obvious considerations that they are worried
that a restriction of their investment set may be costly in terms of generated returns and,
as a consequence on their bonuses. The role of portfolio managers is key in mainstreaming
SRI polices, hence it is important to study the problem of how to encourage them to move
in such a direction. Sundblad et al (2009) present an analysis on their attitudes toward
policy regulations, we are interested here in a theoretical study on how to set correct
incentives.
We consider the problem of an investor who wants to invest her wealth according to a
socially responsible rule and to this end delegates a portfolio manager, who has a superior
knowledge of the market. The manager is paid a fee that is proportional to the total return
produced by the portfolio. The market is composed of \green"and \non-green "assets1.
1Hereafter we call \green"those assets that full a given SRI requirements and we call \non-green "all
others assets. Consequently we call \green"those investors who trade only in green assets, and \conven-
3A socially responsible investor wants the manager to invest only in "green" assets. Such
a constraint reduces the investment opportunities of the manager and has therefore a
negative impact on his expected compensation, hence the investor compensates him by
increasing the bonus. How is such a bonus related to the characteristics of the market, of
the agents, and of the skill of the agents? Those are the kind of questions that we address
in the paper.
The problem that we formulated is a stylized version of a rather common situation
when an institutional investor wants to invest by maximizing the expected return, but
also obeying to some non-nancial constraint. The investor may also be interpreted as a
government who sets a scal bonus to encourage some investments in spite of others.
Our approach to the problem belongs to the set of the Delegated Portfolio Manage-
ment (DPM) literature, see Stracca (2005) for a review. The classical problem of DPM is
that of designing an appropriate contract when the managers information and the eort
expended are not directly observable by the investors. Consequently the appropriate con-
tract should motivate the manager to exert costly eort to gather information and also
induce the portfolio manager to subsequently use such information in choosing a portfolio
with desirable risk characteristics. The literature focuses principally on optimal contract
functions and their eects like in Stoughton (1993), Wei and LiTiwari(2009) and Admati
and Peiderer (1997), but, rather surprisingly, it has devoted little attention to the re-
striction commonly found in the investment policies that denes the contracts between
investors and managers, as shown by Almazan et al (2004). One notable exception is
Gomez and Sharma (2006) where one of the most common constraints, short selling, is
taken into account.
We do not address the problem of which contract function is preferable in case of SRI
constraints to avoid moral hazard or to answer others of the usual questions of DPM. The
main objective of our study is to formulate a model that is simple enough to get explicit
results but also suciently structured to address some important issues such as the impacts
of the manager's risk aversion, of his skill and of the loss in diversication opportunities,
tional "those who trade any asset
4on the compensation scheme when a constrained investment mandate is proposed. To this
goal we consider a single-period model where the allocation universe consists of a number
of risky assets, only some of which can be considered as \green", according, for instance,
to one, or all, of the common screening policies considering environmental, social and
governance issues, and the rest are \non-green ". The market also contains a riskless asset
that is considered as green. Of course, restricting the investment set reduces the expected
utility and yields to what can be called a \sustainability cost ". Whereas the common
approach is to consider a reservation utility that is exogenously determined, here we relate
it to a possible alternative conventional contract for the manager. To compensate for the
reduction in the set of investment opportunities, the socially responsible investor oers
an extra fee on the return of his allocation strategy with respect to a conventional fund,
that we call the \green bonus ". By increasing the incentive fee, the investor expands the
manager's opportunities, thereby partially undoing the eects imposed by SRI screening.
Therefore, the problem for the green investor is that of setting the bonus and select a
competent manager. Indeed, as in Bhattachary and Peiderer (1985), we assume that,
after being employed, the manager observes a private signal that can be used to forecast
the future returns of assets. The investor's goal is to design a contract that is not too
expensive for her but sucient to attract a manager with a sucient skill. Bhattachary
and Peiderer (1985) consider a market with a single risky asset and hence the eciency
of the manager, dened as the precision of his forecast, could be measured by the variance
of the private signal (a positive real number). In our case, the market is composed by
many assets and hence the variance of the signal perceived by the manager is a positive
denite matrix. This arises some new issues on the ranking of the managers based on their
skills.
Adopting a linear sharing rule, assuming a risk-neutral investor and a risk-averse
portfolio manager and considering normal returns, we derive an explicit formula for the
green bonus that takes into account the manager's expertise and relates the bonus to the
statistical features of the assets involved and/or discarded by the screening. Our setting
5allows us to decompose the bonus into two terms, one taking into account the missed
investment and risk diversication opportunities, the other one compensating the missed
exploitation of the signal by the manager, that is the fact that the manager receives a
signal on the whole market but he can exploit it only on the green assets. We study the
properties of such a bonus and propose an example applying the formula to market data in
the case of screening of nancial assets from S&P500 of December 2006 according to some
SRI criteria. Finally, considering the managers' selection problem, we show that managers
with higher expertise on the green assets require a lower bonus than equally skilled, but
less "green-focused" managers, that is, as in Kreps (1997), stronger intrinsic motivations
require smaller extrinsic incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: in Section 2 we present the model
and the optimisation problem; in Section 3 we derive the solution in two cases, with and
without private signal; discussing the result about the green bonus and introducing a
denition of manager's expertise; nally we discuss the problem of manager's selection.
2 The model
We consider a one period economy, with two agents: a risk neutral investor, and a portfolio
manager with exponential utility function u(x) =  exp( x); where the coecient of risk
aversion  is common knowledge. There are n risky assets with return X distributed as a
multivariate normal with mean  X and variance  and one riskless asset with return R. The
risky investment set can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets, the rst one composed
by p \green"assets with return P, normally distributed with mean  P and variance P and




























6where PQ is an pq matrix and the superscript T represents transposition. Our setting
is an extension of Bhattachary and Peiderer (1985) to the case of n risky assets and the
distinction between \green"and \non-green"assets.
The manager receives a noisy signal on the return X, given by
S = X + ;
where X and  are uncorrelated and  is a normal n-dimensional random variable with
mean zero and variance . The random vector  is the noise of the signal, hence the skill
of a manager is represented by the variance . The manager decides on the investment
after having observed a value S.
Following Bhattachary and Peiderer (1985) we can show that the conditional distri-
bution of X given S = S is a normal random variable with mean
M(S) =  X + 
 1
S (S    X)
where S =  +  and variance
V =    
 1
S :
Note that V is a symmetric positive denite matrix that does not depend on S.



















The SRI investor allocates a capital W0 to a manager with the mandate to trade only
on the green assets and on the riskless one. The compensation of the manager is
f(W) := AR + bW; (1)
7where the parameter A is a xed amount received at the beginning of the period and b is










where !P is a p dimensional vector representing the allocation in the green assets and 1p
is the p dimensional vector of all ones. We assume that the manager can also choose a
second contract without investment restriction, whose payo is
r(W












where ! is an n dimensional vector representing the allocation in the whole investment
set (green and non-green assets). The dierence:
 := b   b0
between the two fees is the \green bonus "and reects the compensation for the restriction
on the investment set.
The manager observes the signal only after having accepted the contract. After it, he
determines the optimal allocation !
P by optimising his expected utility
E[ u(f(W(!P)))jS = S ] (5)
allocating the wealth W0 in the green assets. The decision on whether or not accepting
the contract must be taken before observing the signal on the basis of the expected utility
over all possible signals. Of course, the decision depends on the bonus  oered by the
8investor. Hence the manager accepts the green contract if the participation constraint
E [ u(f(W)) ]  E [ u(r(W
0)) ]; (6)
is satised. We refer to the right hand side of (6) as the manager's \reservation utility ".
Note that both W and W 0 depend on the manager's allocation !P and !, respectively,
which depend on the observed signal S and also on the matrix , moreover the optimal
allocation !
P (resp. !) is a function of the contract parameter b (resp. b0), thus !
P
is a function of . In the following, we explicitly indicate only one or two of all these
dependencies at a time for the sake of a simpler notation.
The principal maximises the expectation of her nal wealth after rewarding the man-
ager. We remark that we do not impose any short-sale constraint and that the compensa-
tion of the manager may also turn out to be negative, that is the contract does not have













E [ u(AR + (b0 + )W(!P))jS = S ] (8)
E [ u(f(W)) ]  E [ u(r(W
0)) ] (9)
Note that, to not overload formulas, we did not report explicitly the dependence on all the
input variables. In particular, we wish to remind that the solution of the problem depends
on the manager's skill .
3 The Optimal Bonus
In the following section we solve the problem specied in (7),(8),(9). First we solve it in
the simpler case where the manager does not receive any private signal. Later we solve
the general case with private information. The separate study of these two cases allows
us to decompose the green bonus into two terms, the rst one taking into account the
9dierences in the investment opportunities, the second one considering the potentiality
of the unexploited signal in virtue of the investment restriction. Thus we can distinguish
how much of the bonus depends on the properties of the market and how much on the
manager's expertise. This will be useful to set the bonus to select a manager of a sucient
expertise.
3.1 The case of managers without private information
We present here a simplied version of the model where the investor and the manager have
access to the same information on the asset's returns and the investor needs to hire the
manager because she cannot directly trade. This situation is equivalent to the case where
the signal is so noisy that the observation of S does not provide any valuable information
to the manager.












E [ u(AR + (b0 + )W(!P)) ] (11)
E [ u(f(W)) ]  E [ u(r(W
0)) ] (12)
whose solution is in the following Proposition.





where HP = ( P   R1p)T
 1
P ( P   R1p) and H = ( X   R1n)T 1( X   R1n).
Proof . We prove rst that the manager participation constraint (12) is satised if    0
and then we show that the principal expected utility is decreasing respect to .








since W is normally distributed.






( P   R1p)
 1
P :
Hence the maximum expected utility obtained substituting !
P into (14) is








Analogously the reservation utility on the right hand side of (12), is given by
U0(r(W






Substituting into (12) we get (13).
The expected value of the principal's wealth, obtained by substituting the optimal
solution !
P into (10), is







that is a decreasing function of , hence the principal chooses the smallest  satisfying
the constraint. 
The value  0 is the minimal bonus necessary to convince an agent (who does not
receive any private signal) to accept the \green"mandate. Note that H and HP are the
squared Sharpe Ratios of the total market portfolio and of the \green"market, respectively,
hence  0 is always positive. The Sharpe Ratios' dierence measures the loss of expected
risk adjusted returns. Figure 1 gives an interpretation of the eect of the green bonus.
11The left panel shows the green ecient frontier (dashed line) that of course is below the
conventional one (solid line). Recall that the slopes are given by the Sharpe ratios. The
two optimal allocations (green and conventional) belong to two dierent utility curves. In
the right panel it can be seen how the green bonus  0 shifts the green ecient frontier
upwards (dash-dot line) so that the new green optimal allocation now belongs to the same
utility curve as the conventional one.
The optimal green bonus  0 is inversely proportional to the risk aversion and to W0
that represents the Asset Under Management. The inverse relation with the risk aversion is
explained by the fact that more risk averse managers invest less in the risky assets and more
in the risk-free asset, hence the loss in diversication is smaller and, consequently, a smaller
bonus is required. Figure 2 represents  0 as a function of relative risk aversion 
M for
three dierent screening criteria, where M is the risk aversion of the investor who chooses
the market portfolio. Input data for this example are the monthly return of the S&P index
assets, December 2006, screened via ESG criteria using strengths and concerns provided
by KLD. The screening process excludes 147, 336 and 417 assets (on 488) respectively
for the Environment, the Governance and the Social dimensions. Obviously, a stronger
screening implies a higher green bonus. The case considered shows that the green bonus
has to be rather small (never higher than 20 basis points), because the loss in terms of
Sharpe Ratio due to the screening is in all these examples very small.
12Figure 1: The Figure represents the eect of the green bonus on the manager's allocation
and utility. The solid line and the dashed line are, respectively, the conventional and the
green ecient frontiers. The left panel shows the conventional optimal allocation and the
green one without a bonus. Of course, the green allocation provides the manager a lower
utility than the conventional one. The right panel shows that the minimum green bonus
 0 shifts the green ecient frontier upwards (dashdot line) so that the green optimal
allocation gives the same utility of the optimal conventional allocation
Figure 2: The minimum green bonus  0 (in basis points) is plotted in function of =M
(risk aversion divided market risk aversion) for three dierent screening. The screening
process has excluded the 30% , 69%, 85% of assets respectively for the Environment, the
Governance and the Social dimensions.
133.2 The case of private information
Now we consider the case of managers that receive a private signal with a variance . In
this case, the optimal bonus is given by the following
Proposition 2 The solution of the optimisation problem (7), (8), (9) is
  =  0 + ; (17)












Proof . First we consider the manager's participation constraint (6) then we show that
the principal utility is decreasing in , and hence the thesis follows.








P (MP(S)   R1p) (19)






 1(M(S)   R1n); (20)
otherwise. The corresponding expected utilities are



















HP(S) = (MP(S)   R1p)
TV
 1
P (MP(S)   R1p):
To compute the expectations of (21) and (22) we consider the random variables M(S) 
N( X;Q) and MP(S)  N( P;QP), where Q = 
 1
S  and QP is the sub-matrix of Q








where A is a n  n positive denite matrix and v is a n-dimensional normal random







with c = T(B 1 B 1H 1B 1), H = (A+B 1) and In the identity matrix of dimension
n. Since M(S) and MP(S) are normally distributed,
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Then we obtain that manager's participation constraint is satised for    , with   as
in (17), by trivial substitution after observing that the expected utility is an increasing
function of . The principal's expected wealth is







15that is decreasing with respect to , hence we have the thesis. 
Note that  is positive since HP(S)  H(S) for any S and hence E[e HP(S)] 
E[e H(S)]. Therefore '(V
 1
















for any . Since the right hand side is equal to one when  = 0, the left hand side is
always greater than one.
While the term  0 measures the cost of sustanaibility in terms of diversication and
earnings opportunity,  reects the opportunity cost of unexploited information.
4 Manager's expertise and selection
Now we propose a denition for manager's expertise in relation to the matrix which
represents the skills and we discuss the problem of manager's selection. We call total





Not that H is always greater than one. Analogously, we call Hg = det(V
 1
P P) the green
expertise and Hc = det(V
 1
Q Q) the non-green expertise. We note that two managers with
dierent skills (represented by ) may have the same total expertise H, as it may be the
case for two manager with a comparable level of expertise on dierent sectors. The term
 is proportional to the ratio between the total and the green expertises, hence it depends










16Note that  is increasing with respect to the total expertise H and decreasing with respect
the green expertise Hg. This means that if two managers have the same total expertise H,
the one with higher expertise on the green assets requires a lower bonus. In the extreme
case of Hg = H, when the agent's expertise is concentrated in the green assets, no eciency
bonus is required.
The term  measures the opportunity cost related to the unexploited information
due to the investment restriction. In fact the manager receives a signal on all the available
assets, but he can exploit and traduce into earnings only those information related to
the green assets which include not only information regarding directly the green but any
other information on the non-green ones which can be exploited through the correlation. A
manager whose expertise is concentrated in the green assets is not losing any opportunity
when asked to restrict the investment universe, and hence does not require any extra
compensation. In fact if the correlation between two assets is strong a signal on one of
them is useful also for estimating the other. Consider a  diagonal, it can be show in
case n = 2 by a straightforward computation that  reaches a maximum when  is equal
zero.
Let us consider the case of two assets (one green and one conventional) with cor-
relation . Figure 3 shows the green bonus   with the two components  0 and  as a
function of . The term  0 grows unbounded as  approaches 1 or  1 because when the
assets are strongly correlated the diversication opportunity is so high that the manager
would not give up it; the minimum is reached for  =
HP
HQ, if HP < HQ (otherwise for
 =
HQ
HP ). On the contrary the minimal  is reached when  is 1 or  1, because when the
assets are very correlated, the signal gives information with the same accuracy over all the
assets (green and non-green) hence the manager can exploit it completely and nothing is
lost. For the same reason the highest value of  is reached for  = 0 because when assets
are uncorrelated the manager can not exploit the information on the conventional assets
investing only on the green ones.
Finally we note that the green bonus   converges to  0 as  goes to zero;  goes to
17Figure 3: The green bonus   (the solid line) is plotted against the correlation decomposed
into  0 (the dashed line) and  (the dotted line). The term  0 goes to innitive as  ! 1
because when assets are so strictly correlated the diversication opportunity is so high
that the manager would not give up it.
zero when the assets are strongly correlated and when H
Hg approaches 1. The quantity H
Hg
goes to one when Hg goes to H that is when the manager is specialised in green.
To address the problem of selecting managers we require some extra assumptions; it
is a common and meaningful assumption to consider the expertise as unknown. With a
linear contract, if the expertise is not known and the principal wants to attract a manager
with at least an expertise equal to a certain value ^ H, she will also attract any manager
with lower expertise. However the investor would prefer to hire a manager with at least a
suitable value of green expertise ^ Hg. We assume that the principal is able to acquire some
information on the total expertise of the manager on the market, that is she knows H, but
she ignores the manager's expertise on the green market Hg. The principal who decides
to attract a manager of a known H level of expertise and at least a \green "expertise level
of ^ Hg must then set  to the value 0 obtained by replacing ^ Hg into (18). In this way the
principal is sure to attract from the pool of manager of that total expertise those with green
expertise greater than ^ Hg. See Figure 4. A suggestive interpretation of this result, following
Kreps (1997), can be that the manager has something like an intrinsic motivation such
that more motivated or dedicated green managers demand smaller extrinsic incentives.
18Figure 4: The principal chooses to attract a manager with at least a \green "expertise level
of ^ Hg, setting  = 0 for a known H level of expertise, the principal is sure to attract
from the pool of manager of that total expertise the ones with green expertise greater
than ^ Hg.
5 Conclusion
This work is a rst attempt to formulate a model of delegated portfolio management with
constraints on the investment universe. In particular we focused on constraints given by
SRI phylosophy and we studied the problem of setting a \green "bonus and determined
the minimum incentive required by a manager to give up earnings opportunity and di-
versication provided by the conventional assets. Such a quantity can be also interpreted
as the cost of sustainability borne by the manager. Our approach also takes into account
the possibility of extracting valuable information for example from typical Socially Re-
sponsible qualities, like Environmmental, Social or Governmental ones, as they may be
considered as a way to improve the expertise of the portfolio manager. Our simple model
permits to disentangle the eect on the green bonus of the statistical properties of market
of the manager's skill and of his risk aversion. Finally we provide a denition for manager's
expertise and we tackled the problem of selecting managers.
We leave for future researches the extension of the present approach to other kinds of
contracts, for instance asymmetric and with limited liability, or where the bonus is related
19to a benchmark. It would also be interesting to consider a multi-period model to take into
consideration issues connected to long and short-term incentives.
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